Remuneration system for members of the Management Board of Hella Geschäftsführungsgesellschaft mbH

I. Objectives and comprehensive overview

The remuneration system for the Management Board provides incentives for successful implementation of the corporate strategy and sustainable and long-term development of the Company. When determining the remuneration, the Shareholder Committee follows the principle of granting compensation which is in-line with market standards and competitive as well as individually appropriate to the requirements and performance profile of the individual Managing Directors, which is proportionate to the size of the Company and to its business and earnings situation and which avoids excessive risks being taken.

To this end, the remuneration system – with its two performance-related components – is bound to important operating indicators that reflect the Company’s success and are included in the financial performance indicators for the corporate management. The relevant targets are reviewed annually by the Shareholder Committee and set at a demanding level, in accordance with the corporate strategy and planning. The chief concern is for the Company’s growth to outstrip that of the market as a whole. In addition, the performance-related remuneration reflects the performance of the share price and the total shareholder return of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA. This ensures that the remuneration is linked to the long-term economic development of the Company and that the interests of the Management Board align with those of the shareholders. In addition, within the performance-related remuneration, each year the Shareholder Committee sets special (prioritised) targets, which are in part addressed individually to the individual Managing Directors and which also include aspects of corporate social responsibility (Environmental, Social & Governance, “ESG”). For example, the ESG targets set for the fiscal year 2021/2022 include the reduction of the accident rate, the turnover rate in the workforce and the specific energy intensity.

The individual remuneration of the Managing Directors consists of three components:

- non-performance-related fixed remuneration (plus non-performance-related benefits in kind, other ancillary benefits and pension commitments),

- an annual performance-related component (short-term incentive, “STI”) and

- a long-term incentive (“LTI”).
The performance-related remuneration components are subject – individually and jointly – to a maximum limit (“Cap”). In addition, the Shareholder Committee may adjust the performance-related remuneration at its discretion until the date of payment, in particular to account for extraordinary developments. In addition, there are scenarios where repayment can be demanded (“clawback”).

If the targets set by the Shareholder Committee are 100% achieved, the STI will be 1.1 times the annual fixed salary and the allocated LTI base amount will be 1.2 times the annual fixed salary (“target remuneration”). If the target remuneration is achieved, both performance-related remuneration components each outweigh the fixed remuneration, which reflects the incentive-driven approach of the remuneration system. In this case, the share of the long-term component predominates within the performance-related remuneration, which expresses the particular importance of sustainable corporate development.
As an overview, the remuneration system can be summarised overall as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-performance-related components</td>
<td>Ensures an appropriate basic income in order to prevent the taking of inappropriate risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual fixed salary (approx. 38% of total remuneration)</td>
<td>- Paid in 12 monthly installments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reviewed annually for appropriateness.</td>
<td>Remuneration is in kind and other ancillary benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mainly the possibility of using the company car for private purposes and inclusion in the Group's D&amp;O insurance.</td>
<td>Performance-related components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term variable remuneration (STI) (approx. 33% of total remuneration)</td>
<td>- One-year bonus as a multiple (1.1 times with 100% target achievement) of the annual fixed salary depending on the degree to which certain targets are reached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Operating KPIs (50-70% of STI): EBIT (70%) and ROIC (30%).</td>
<td>- Special (prioritised) targets (30-50% of STI) consisting of collective/team targets and individual targets, set anew each year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Target remuneration at 100% target achievement: 1.1 times the annual fixed salary.</td>
<td>- Cap at 300% target achievement: 3.3 times the annual fixed salary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term variable remuneration (LTI) (approx. 34% of total remuneration)</td>
<td>- Bonus with five-year calculation period, calculated in the initial allocation as a multiple of the annual fixed salary (1.2 times fixed amount with 100% target achievement).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- LTI base amount depending on the ROIC achieved in the initial year.</td>
<td>- Development of value of the LTI base amount tracks the development of EBIT margin, ROIC and total shareholder return since the allocation year (both positive and negative).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Payment in cash after the end of the calculation period.</td>
<td>- Target remuneration at 100% target achievement: 1.2 times the annual fixed salary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Cap relating at 300% target achievement: 3.6 times the annual fixed salary.</td>
<td>End-of-service payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement upon dismissal prior to the end of the term of the service agreement</td>
<td>If the Managing Director has not given cause for termination, the total of annual fixed salary and STI for the remaining contractual period, but for no more than two years, will be paid as settlement. LTI base amounts already allocated will be reduced pro rata temporis and paid at the end of the calculation period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post- contractual non-competition clause</td>
<td>Development of the value of the LTI base amount over five years rewards long-term and sustainable value creation and penalises negative developments (bonus/penalty system).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Duration between 12 and 20 months, agreed on an individual basis.</td>
<td>- Creation of a balance of interests between the Management Board and shareholders specifically by alignment with the total shareholder return (TSR).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Non-competition compensation of 50% of the annual fixed salary fixed netted against settlement and pension payments and earnings from any other activities.</td>
<td>Change of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Waiver of non-competition clause by Company possible, non-competition compensation will then no longer apply.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. Procedure for determining and reviewing the remuneration system

The legal form of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA gives rise to a particularity: it is not the Supervisory Board that is responsible for the remuneration of the Management Board; instead, this is the duty of the Shareholder Committee. According to the Articles of Association, it is incumbent upon the Shareholder Committee to regulate the legal relations between the Company and the General Partner – insofar as said relations are not explicitly governed by the Articles of Association or the law – by means of agreements. It is also responsible for regulating the employment relationships of the Managing Directors of the currently sole General Partner, Hella Geschäftsführungsgesellschaft mbH. This gives the Shareholder Committee full responsibility for determining the remuneration system of the Management Board.

The Shareholder Committee is supported by its Personnel Committee, which currently has three members (the Chairman of the Shareholder Committee and two additional members elected by the Shareholder Committee). The Personnel Committee prepares the resolutions of the Shareholder Committee on the appointment and removal of Managing Directors as
well as on the remuneration system and on the Managing Directors’ individual total remuneration. Both in the Personnel Committee and in plenary with the Shareholder Committee, the rules generally applicable to handling conflicts of interest apply. These include the rule laid down in the rules of procedure, which obliges each of the committee members to disclose conflicts of interest to the Shareholder Committee. In addition, remuneration topics are regularly discussed and decided in the Personnel Committee and in plenary with the Shareholder Committee without the participation of the Management Board. The committees call in external expertise to the extent that they deem necessary, whereby, in the event that a remuneration expert is brought in, due attention is paid to his/her independence from the Management Board and the Company. To assess whether the total remuneration is in line with customary market practice, the Shareholder Committee looks to studies performed on the remuneration of management boards at MDAX companies as a basis for comparison (“peer group”). The Shareholder Committee does not take the ratio of the remuneration of the Managing Directors to the remuneration of the senior management and the workforce into account, as it considers other factors to be more adequate and significant in determining the level of remuneration.

III. Remuneration components

A) Annual fixed salary, remuneration in kind as well as other ancillary benefits

The non-performance-related remuneration component consists of an annual fixed salary and remuneration in kind as well as other ancillary benefits.

The annual fixed salary is paid in 12 equal monthly instalments. The amount of the fixed salary reflects the role of the Managing Director within the Management Board as well as the experience, area of responsibility and market conditions. The Shareholder Committee reviews the suitability of the fixed salary on an annual basis.

The remuneration in kind and other ancillary benefits primarily consist of the private use of a company car. Furthermore, all the Managing Directors in their capacity as members of the Company’s governing bodies are covered by the Group's D&O insurance. In the event of any claim, they are responsible for a deductible of at least 10% of the loss capped at one-and-a-half times their fixed salary.

B) Short-term variable remuneration (“STI”)

Short-term variable compensation (STI) is calculated depending on the degree to which certain objectives are achieved, which are divided into the categories of “operating key performance indicators” and “special (prioritised) objectives”. The target remuneration of the STI is 1.1 times the annual fixed salary. This is determined by the fixed salary at the
beginning of the respective fiscal year. Said remuneration is paid out on one occasion in the fiscal year. In the case of new hires or resignations during the year, the STI is granted pro rata temporis.

Composition of short-term variable remuneration (STI)

Operating key performance indicators

The operating KPIs incorporate (i) the HELLA Group's earnings before taxes (EBT) and effects on earnings from the restructuring for the fiscal year in question adjusted for special effects (extraordinary expenses and income reportable in the consolidated financial statements under Section 277(4) HGB (old version)) with a weighting of 70% and (ii) the operating free cash flow (OFCF) prior to effects of the restructuring on earnings with a weighting of 30%. The OFCF is calculated after investments and divestments (procurement and disposal of property, plant and equipment and intangible assets) and does not include company acquisitions.

The degree of achieving the operating KPIs to be ascertained by the Shareholder Committee can be between 0 and 300%. For this purpose, prior to the start of each fiscal year, the Shareholder Committee for EBT and OFCF sets ambitious minimum, target and maximum values, which it regularly reviews on the basis of the corporate planning and on performance of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA. At its reasonable discretion, the Shareholder Committee is entitled to change or redefine the operating KPIs applied (EBT and OFCF) with effect for following fiscal years.

The respective target achievement level is derived from the minimum, target and maximum values which have been established. Intermediate values are determined by linear interpolation and the degree of target achievement thus determined is rounded to full
percentage points, in accordance with standard commercial practice. The following figure provides a schematic representation of the resulting target achievement curve:

![Target achievement curve EBT and OFCF](image)

**Special (prioritised) objectives**

In addition, the Shareholder Committee can also define special (“prioritised”) targets for the Management Board which, on the basis of a target agreement with the management, also encompass qualitative parameters and are composed of collective/team targets – which apply to the Management Board in equal measure – and individual targets. These prioritised targets may be incorporated – as the Shareholder Committee sees fit – into the STI calculation with a total weighting of between 30 and 50%, in which case, the weighting of the EBT and OFCF is reduced accordingly.

In the context of an overall assessment performed by the Shareholder Committee on the degree of achievement of the prioritised targets, the determined value can be between 0 and 300%.

**C) Long-term variable remuneration (long-term incentive, “LTI”)**

The long-term variable remuneration (long-term incentive, LTI) is also paid in cash. It is measured by the performance of the return on invested capital (RoIC) and the EBT margin as well as by the performance of the HELLA share (total shareholder return). The long-term
variable remuneration is based on a calculation period of five fiscal years in total, thus ensuring a long-term, sustainable incentivising effect.

Composition of long-term variable remuneration (LTI)

\[
\text{Amount of LTI paid} = 120\% \times \frac{\text{Achievement of RoIC (0–300%)}}{\text{LTI base amount}}
\]

Return on invested capital (RoIC)

The return on invested capital (RoIC) is used by the Company as a strategic management parameter. It is defined as the ratio of operating income before interest and after taxes (return) to invested capital. Return is calculated on the basis of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for the past twelve months at the level of the Group units, less the standard income tax rate applicable in the country in question. Invested capital is the average of the opening and closing value of the assets shown on the face of the balance sheet excluding cash and cash equivalents and current financial assets less liabilities carried on the face of the balance sheet excluding current and non-current financial liabilities for the reporting period.

EBT margin

The EBT margin is calculated from the HELLA Group's earnings before taxes (EBT) divided by the HELLA Group's sales.

Total shareholder return

Total shareholder return is defined as the performance of the HELLA share plus dividends paid. To this end, the volume-weighted average price of the last 20 trading days of the fiscal year in which the calculation period of an LTI instalment begins is compared with those of the last 20 trading days of the subsequent fiscal years in the calculation period. The dividends paid in the interim are added. Technical price effects (e.g. in the case of share splits) are, on the other hand, deducted.
Calculation methods

The payment amount for an LTI instalment is calculated as follows:

Firstly, an LTI base amount is determined for the first fiscal year in the calculation period. This amount is calculated as a fixed percentage of the annual fixed salary depending on the RoIC. For the RoIC, the Shareholder Committee defines minimum (= 0% target achievement), target (= 100% target achievement) and maximum values (= 300% target achievement). The minimum value defines the floor for calculating an LTI base amount. This results in the following schematic target achievement curve for the RoIC:

![Target achievement curve RoIC](image)

If the target value is reached, the LTI base amount is equal to 1.2 times the annual fixed salary; if the maximum value is reached, the LTI base amount is equal to 3.6 times the annual fixed salary. If a Managing Director joins or leaves the Management Board during the year, the LTI base amount for the relevant fiscal year will be granted pro rata temporis.

Payment of an LTI instalment is made to the Managing Directors once the calculation period comprising a total of five fiscal years has come to an end. For example, the LTI instalment allocated for the fiscal year 2020/2021 will be paid out at the end of the fiscal year 2024/2025. The payment amount derived from the LTI base amount is determined equally on the basis of economic success over the entire five-year term of the respective LTI instalment. In mathematical terms, this takes place as follows: First, 1/5 of the LTI base amount is defined. This amount is notionally assigned to the first fiscal year of the
calculation period. The remaining 4/5 of the LTI base amount will change in accordance with the performance of (i) the RoIC, (ii) the EBT margin of the HELLA Group and (iii) the share performance in the four subsequent fiscal years of the calculation period. For this purpose, the figures for the fiscal year for which the LTI base amount was calculated are compared with all subsequent fiscal years of the calculation period. If, in a subsequent fiscal year of the calculation period, the figures have improved (worsened) compared to the first fiscal year, 1/5 of the LTI base amount will be increased (reduced) and frozen to the benefit of the Managing Director (see schematic below).

An increase in the EBT margin and/or the RoIC by one percentage point will result in an increase of 7.5% in the pro rata LTI base amount, while every decrease by the same amount will lead to a corresponding decrease. Total shareholder return has a direct proportional effect – i.e. a positive (negative) total shareholder return of 30%, for example, increases (decreases) the pro rata LTI base amount by 30%. Once these comparisons have been carried out for all fiscal years of the calculation period, the total of the frozen amounts will be paid to the Managing Directors at the end of the calculation period.
This does not give rise to any entitlement on the part of the Company to recover any compensation from a Managing Director in the event of a negative overall LTI settlement amount. In addition, it is not netted against a future positive LTI settlement amount.

**Reductions upon termination of service agreement**

If a member of the Management Board leaves the Company, the LTI base amounts already allocated expire in full upon departure for periods after the date of termination of the service agreement if (i) the relevant agreement is terminated for an important reason for which the Management Board member is responsible within the meaning of § 626 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB), or (ii) the member of the Management Board terminates the service agreement or requests an early termination agreement or refuses to conclude a new service agreement offered by the Company on equal or improved terms without an important reason for which the Company is responsible within the meaning of § 626 BGB being given. In addition, the LTI payment amount will be reduced proportionately if at the time of departure more than 12 months of the calculation period are missing for a certain LTI instalment. In this case, the LTI payment amount is reduced by 1/60 for each additional missing month of the relevant calculation period beyond the 12 months.

**D) Pension commitments and comparable long-term obligations**

In addition to the fixed remuneration and the variable remuneration components, the Company provides the Managing Directors with pension benefits. With respect to the Managing Directors of Hella Geschäftsführungsgesellschaft mbH, the Company uses a defined contribution pension plan to which it allocates a certain amount each year for the respective Managing Director. This amounts to between 40% to 50% of the annual fixed salary, whereby the fixed salary applicable on 1 June of the year is decisive. The financing year begins on 1 June of each year and ends on 31 May of the following year. If the service agreement begins or ends in the course of the financing year, the Managing Director receives a financing contribution on a pro rata temporis basis. Upon pension eligibility arising, the accrued capital is paid either in a single lump sum or – subject to the Company’s approval – in instalments over a maximum period of eight years. The contributions to the capital account system may be invested externally in one or more investment funds. The return here is based on the performance of the investment assets in question. A minimum interest rate, which is currently 4.5% per annum, is granted in all cases. As a general rule, the capital account is dissolved on 31 May of the year following the Managing Director’s 58th birthday. Eligibility for payment only arises once the Managing Director has left the Company. This period may be extended at a Managing Director’s request and subject to the Company’s approval.
Pension eligibility also arises in the event of full or partial loss of earning capacity, protracted disability due to illness or upon death predating the Managing Director’s contractual date of eligibility. In this case, the capital is paid either in a single lump sum or – subject to the Company's approval – in instalments over a maximum period of eight years to the beneficiaries nominated by the Managing Director.

In addition to the pension plan funded by the Company, the Managing Directors of Hella Geschäftsführungsgesellschaft mbH are free to participate in a further asset-linked pension plan. In this case, capital is accumulated in the form of an individually defined deferred compensation component on the part of the Managing Director and largely follows the rules applicable to the asset-linked pension plan funded by the Company. The minimum interest rate in this model is currently 2.25% per annum.

IV. Remuneration thresholds (“Cap”) and maximum remuneration

The Company has defined a remuneration cap under which the annual STI and LTI payments, seen together, are subject to a maximum equalling six times the applicable annual fixed salary. The fixed salary at the time of payment is decisive. This cap supplements the maximum limits that result from the maximum values for the target achievement levels for STI and LTI individually.

In addition, in accordance with §§ 278 (3), 87a (1) sentence 2 no. 1 AktG, the Shareholder Committee has defined a maximum amount of remuneration. It includes all remuneration elements (in particular also ancillary and other benefits as well as pension commitments) of a single fiscal year and currently amounts to € 9,500 thousand for the Chairman of the Management Board and € 5,000 thousand for the other members of the Management Board. For the variable remuneration components, such as the contractual cap, the maximum remuneration follows from a payment-related approach.

V. Adjustment and reclaim possibilities (“clawback”)

The Shareholder Committee of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA may at its own discretion make a positive or negative adjustment to all variable remuneration components if it is of the opinion that the calculation of the variable remuneration component is not in line with the Company's business performance because of extraordinary effects. The achievement of the strategic targets (including the non-financial objectives, such as the HELLA environmental policy) of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA must also be taken into account.
Furthermore, in the event of a deliberate or grossly negligent breach of duty of care committed by a Managing Director, the Company reserves the right to claim back or refuse to pay out the variable remuneration components granted to this Managing Director for the fiscal year 2020/2021 or subsequent fiscal years (“clawback”). These contractually agreed reclaim possibilities supplements any legal claims which may exist.

VI. Term of contract and termination benefits for Managing Directors

The term of the contracts is aligned with the term of the appointments. The employment relationship ends automatically at the end of the month in which the statutory retirement age is reached, but no earlier than the end of the month in which the Managing Director reaches the age of 65. Furthermore, the employment relationship automatically ends three months after the end of the month in which the permanent disability of the Managing Director is determined.

A) Loss of earning capacity or death

In the event of illness-related disability, the fixed salary or the difference over sickness benefits will be paid for up to 18 months. In the case of death, the eligible beneficiaries receive the deceased Managing Director’s fixed salary for a period of three months commencing with the month of death.

B) Settlement

If the Company revokes the appointment prior to the date of expiry of the service agreement, the service agreement can be terminated prematurely under exceptional circumstances. In cases in which the service agreement is terminated for material reasons for which the Managing Director is not responsible, a settlement of two times his/her annual remuneration or, if the residual term of the service agreement is less than two years, a time-proportionate amount of the settlement is paid. For this purpose, the annual remuneration equals the sum total of the fixed annual salary plus short-term variable annual remuneration less remuneration in kind and other ancillary benefits for the last full fiscal year prior to the termination of the appointment. This remuneration is to be offset against any non-compete compensation. In addition, a subsequent payment of apportioned LTI base amounts will be made, although they will be reduced pro rata based on the remaining part of the calculation period. In certain cases, the LTI base amounts not yet due for payment lapse completely upon exit (“bad leaver”). See Section III. C) above under “Reductions upon termination of service agreement”.

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C) Change of Control

The same settlement rules also apply in the event of a change of control. In this case, a Managing Director may resign from his/her post and give notice on the service agreement for good cause by the end of the sixth calendar month after a change of control, with effect from the end of the ninth calendar month. In this case, there is no termination of the long-term variable remuneration as described above in Section III. C) under “Reductions upon termination of the service agreement”. Until the resignation has taken effect, the Managing Director must support the Company in all matters relating to the change of control, acting to the best of his/her ability and working in the interests of the Company. A change of control within the meaning of the service agreement for managing directors is given if a third party or several jointly acting third parties who do not belong to the family shareholders of HELLA GmbH & Co. KGaA

- acquire more than 50% of the Company's voting share capital,
- bring the Company under its control by entering into a controlling agreement or
- appoint and dismiss, in any other way, the majority of the members of the Company's executive bodies and/or their personally liable partners without the consent of family shareholders.

D) Post-contractual non-competition clause

Furthermore, the Managing Director is subject to a post-contractual non-compete clause, the term of which varies between 12 and 24 months, to be agreed on an individual basis. During the period of the prohibition of competition, the Managing Director receives non-compete compensation in the amount of 50% of the last annual fixed salary, with any compensation for early termination of the contract and other income from work to be credited during the non-competition period. The compensation is paid monthly. The total amount of the non-compete compensation is credited to a pension commitment owed by the Company (see Section III. D) above). Prior to the end of the service agreement, in individual cases, the Company may waive the post-contractual non-compete clause. As a result, the compensation is only payable for a period of six months from the date of said clause being waived. If the service agreement ends on reaching the statutory retirement age or by a termination declared by the Company for good cause, the Company will immediately be released from the obligation to pay compensation if it has waived the stipulation of complying with the non-compete clause before or at the same time as the end of the employment contract.
VII. Recognition of remuneration for work on supervisory boards or similar bodies

The assumption of Supervisory Board and similar mandates in the professional sector requires the prior approval of the Shareholder Committee. If members of the Management Board hold positions on the management or executive board, or on Supervisory Board mandates or similar mandates within the Group as well as in offices in associations or similar organisations, any remuneration granted as part of such will be counted against the annual fixed salary. In the case of other mandates, in particular those outside the Group, the Shareholder Committee determines a deduction on a case-by-case basis. In particular, it takes into account the extent to which the Company has to dispense with the individual labour of the Managing Director as a result of the mandate being assumed.